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Abstract 
Issues of intellectual and cultural hegemony have long been critical foci in education debates in South Africa. This is evidenced
in present times by the call for an African Renaissance in education, as well as, a growing discourse that demands the 
acknowledgement and inclusion of indigenous knowledge systems in the South African education system. This article considers 
the epistemological question that centres around the debate of whether there is, in fact, an indigenous African way of knowing,
and if so, what the implications for education research would be. 
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1. Introduction 
There is an extensive discourse on community in Africa. This discourse embraces philosophical, sociological, as 
well as political inferences, and also, influences the nature of education research. In what follows, I will discuss 
these philosophical, sociological and political inferences in the discourse of community in Africa, and explore 
how this discourse influences research in education. In so doing, I will attempt in this essay to address the 
following: 
x can we speak of an indigenous African epistemology? 
x the discourse on community in Africa and the role of education research; 
x what are the implications of an indigenous African epistemology of community for education 
research? 
1.1. Can we speak of an indigenous african epistemology? 
     The question of an indigenous African epistemology or knowledge system, that is, of an African philosophy 
with a distinctive African epistemic identity is not unproblematic. In the light of Africa's colonial legacy, African 
philosophy is confronted with the problem of establishing its own unique African order of knowledge. The 
* Philip Higgs. Tel.: 270829207014 
E-mail address: Higgsp@unisa.ac.za 
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Philip Higgs / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 2414–2421 2415
attempt to establish a distinctively African epistemic identity within the discipline of philosophy has brought into 
question what it means to be 'an African', and what it means to be 'a philosopher' in an African context.
1.2. What it means to be African 
    The question of what meaning we attach to the adjective 'African' when we talk about 'African philosophy' is 
a crucial debate in attempts at establishing a uniquely African order of knowledge.  
Some African philosophers, for example, Mudimbe (1988) and Hountondji(1983,1985), regard an intellectual 
product as African simply because it is produced or promoted by Africans. They, therefore, adopt a geographical 
criterion in their definition of the term 'African' in 'African philosophy' in that they regard African philosophy as 
the contributions of Africans practising philosophy within the defined framework of the discipline and its 
historical and geographic traditions. 
But then another criterion, referred to as the cultural criterion, is also used to determine was is meant by 
'African' in African philosophy. According to this criterion, a philosophical work is 'African' if it directs its 
attention to issues concerning the theoretical or conceptual underpinnings of African culture. Such a view is 
clearly presented by Gyekye (1987:72) when he writes: "Philosophy is a cultural phenomenon in that 
philosophical thought is grounded in cultural experience." According to this view then, the study of the traditional 
African world in terms of views, ideas, and conceptions represents the unique substance of African philosophy 
and legitimates reference to what is referred to as ‘African’. 
In citing the two polarised views as to what constitutes being “African”, namely the views dictated to by either 
a geographical or cultural criterion, I would like to suggest that a distinctively African identity in not constituted 
by a case of either/or, but rather by both/and. That is, both geographical and cultural factors constitute an African 
identity in that these factors are necessary constituents in the experience of being ‘African’. 
1.3. What is philosophy in an African context? 
With regard to the term "philosophy", two conceptions of philosophy have become prominent in debates about 
the idea of African philosophy.  
First is the definition of philosophy as a rational, critical activity. Those who adopt this definition of 
philosophy, for example, Appiah (1989a), Bodunrin (1985), Oladipo (1989), Wiredu (1989,1996) and Hountondji 
(1985,1996), frown at the attempt to equate African philosophy with traditional African world-views. In doing so, 
they make a distinction between philosophy in the popular sense, and philosophy in the academic sense. In the 
first instance, philosophy is regarded as being concerned with traditional African world-views whereas, in an 
academic sense, philosophy is a theoretical discipline like, for example, physics, algebra and linguistics with its 
own distinctive problems and methods. Scholars in Africa who view philosophy in this academic sense are 
referred to as universalist African philosophers because they emphasise reason as a universal human phenomenon.  
There are, however, other African philosophers such as, Anyanwu (1989), Gyekye (1987, 1997, 1998), 
Mabogo(1996), Motshega (1999), Mbiti (1970), Kaphagawani (1998) and Kwame (1992) who maintain that 
traditional African world-views constitute an authentic African philosophy. They insist on a definition of 
philosophy that is broad enough to accommodate these world-views. Recourse to traditional African world-views 
is taken up in the practice of what is called ethno-philosophy. 
The two conceptions of philosophy that have become prominent in debates about the idea of African philosophy 
are thus marked by: 
x those who insist on a strict definition of philosophy on a purity of form; they are out to defend the 
professional integrity of their discipline against the popularisation by cultural nationalists 
x those who give a rather broad definition of philosophy and emphasise the specificity of the content of 
whatever is produced by African philosophers in the practice of ethno-philosophy. 
The concern with definitions of, be they definitions of 'African' or 'philosophy' is considered by some, for 
example, Oladipo (1992) and Appiah (1989b) to be misguided and distracting. Oladipo (1992:22) argues that 
there are no definitions that capture the essence of either the terms 'African' or 'philosophy'. No one definition can 
be credited with a universal application, because both these terms are linked with a social history that impacts 
upon their meaning.  
In responding to the preoccupation with definition Appiah (1989b: 12) points out that: 
2416  Philip Higgs / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 2414–2421
There are other issues for philosophers in Africa to explore now, which require not preliminary 
anxieties as to whether our work fits existing labels but confident examinations of some of the 
questions for which our training happens to have equipped us. 
In the light of these remarks it would seem that the problem surrounding African philosophy is not the problem 
of anything meeting the criteria for being both 'African' and 'philosophical'. Rather it is the problem of the extent 
to which African philosophers have been able to put their intellect in the service of the struggle and destiny of 
Africans. In other words, the issue is not that of whether a contributor to a debate is African-born or whether the 
question under consideration is authentically African in the cultural sense. It is not even the issue of whether what 
they are doing is pure philosophy, applied philosophy, ethno-philosophy, social criticism or whatever. Rather it is 
in the words of Oladipo (1992:24): 
... it is the issue of the extent to which African philosophers have been able to use whatever 
intellectual skills they possess to illuminate the various dimensions of the African predicament. 
This sentiment is taken up in part by African scholars, such as, Serequeberhan (1994), who adopt a
hermeneutical perspective on African philosophy in African philosophy. Rooting themselves in what is traditional 
to Africa, they seek to escape an enslavement to the past by using that past to open up the future. They contend 
that philosophy properly construed must move beyond a preoccupation with universalist abstractions and 
ethnological considerations and call into question the real relations of power in Africa. In this regard, 
Serequeberhan (1994:43) states that: 
The discourse of African philosophy is indirectly and historically linked to the demise of 
European hegemony (colonialism and neocolonialism) and is aimed at fulfilling/completing this 
demise. It is a reflective and critical effort to rethink the indigenised African situation beyond 
the confines of Eurocentric concepts and categories. 
To appreciate the distinctive features of African philosophy, it is also, helpful to compare its method and 
execution with other systems of philosophy. Appiah (1994:144) elucidates the difference between African and 
Western philosophy being mindful of the condescending attitude of the West towards Africa. For Appiah, the 
West considers the issue of what philosophy is 'for' - that is, its social meaning and relevance - with intellectual 
and academic contempt. Undoubtedly, the West does philosophize in a different style and method from Africa, 
although this may be attributed to enormous resources and funding. The West is concerned with perfecting 
philosophical discourse for its own sake, while Africa wants to use philosophy in a particular sense to address 
social issues. 
Central then to the issue of philosophy in Africa is the question of relevance and usefulness. Africa, perhaps 
owing to its level of development at this point, wants philosophy to contribute towards the political, economic, 
ethical and general upliftment of the people. In Africa, philosophy is expected to be pragmatic and to render a 
'service'. It must contribute effectively towards the amelioration of the human condition, the lived and existing 
human condition. Wiredu (as quoted by Anyanwu 1989:127) concludes: “... we will only solve our problems if we 
see them as human problems arising out of a special situation”. Thus, Anyanwu (1989:127) affirms that African 
philosophy “invites people to take a stand on the issue of reality as experienced by Africans.” This experience of 
an African reality gives rise to a sense of commonality in an enunciation of an indigenous African epistemology  
which finds expression in certain general themes in African philosophy, one of these being, the discourse of 
community in Africa, also referred to as communalism.
1.4.  Communalism in Africa and the role of education research 
Communalism in Africa is advanced in philosophical, sociological and political discourses which I would argue 
impact on the role higher education research in Africa. 
In the first instance, the philosophical question that is raised in the discourse on community in Africa is directed at 
whether traditional African societies are in essence community orientated, and if so, what place the individual has 
in such a collectivist perspective. 
 According to Letseka (2000:181) the importance of communality to traditional African life cannot be 
overemphasized. This is because community and belonging to a community of people constitute the very fabric of 
traditional African life. Unlike the Western liberal notion of the individual as some sort of entity that is capable of 
existing and flourishing on its own, unconnected to any community of other individuals, not bound by any 
biological relationships or socioeconomic, political and cultural relationships, obligations, duties, responsibilities 
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and conventions that frame and define any community of individuals, the communal conception of the individual 
in most traditional African settings is described by Mbiti (1970:108) in the following way : 
Whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole group, and whatever happens to the 
whole group happens to the individual. The individual can only say: "I am, because we are; and 
since we are, therefore I am. 
This, Mbiti (1970:109) claims, is a cardinal point in the understanding of the African view of man. 
Commenting on traditional life in Kenya, Kenyatta (1965:297) echoes similar views:  
According to Gikuyu ways of thinking, nobody is an isolated individual, or rather, his 
uniqueness is a secondary fact about him; first and foremost he is several people's relative and 
several people's contemporary.  
Menkiti (1979:158) concurs with this observation when he states:
A crucial distinction thus exists between the African view of man and the view of man found in 
Western thought: in the African view it is the community which defines the person as a person, 
not some isolated static quality of rationality, will or memory.  
In traditional African life then, a person depends on others just as much as others depend on him or her. In fact, 
in terms of such a communitarian view, the individual’s life and fulfilment is only to be found in community with 
others.   
It should be noted, however, that some African intellectuals have challenged this communitarian idea in the 
discourse on community in Africa.  For instance,  Hountondji (1996:xviii) responded  critically to what he called 
unanimism, “ ... the illusion that all men and women in such communal societies speak with one voice and share 
the same opinion about fundamental issues”.  His critical comment in this regard, can be seen as part of his 
general criticism of ethnophilosophy, in which he argues that ethnophilosophy deals with voiceless communities 
where the researcher defines the discourse, and thereby negates any possibility of a two-way conversation 
between researcher and community.   
Then there are some liberal African communitarianists, who in confronting issues such as industrialisation, 
globalisation, information technology, and multiculturalism, try to accommodate values assigned to individuality 
in the research process. Such a point of departure, is evidenced in the work of Gbadegesin (1988.334), who 
advocates a theory of community, 
… that combines an appreciation of, as well as a commitment to, the community as a 
fundamental value, and an understanding of, as well as commitment to, the idea of individual 
rights. 
In like manner, Gyekye  (1998:327) adopts a similar point of departure, when he argues that individual person’s 
within the community are not absorbed by communal or cultural apparatuses and have the capacity to express 
their own individual judgements, or to re-evaluate communal goals, values and practices.  He sees individual 
autonomy as something exercised within communities and states when he says:  
By autonomy, I do not mean self-completeness, but the having of will, a rational will of one’s 
own, that enables one to determine at least some of one’s own goals and to pursue them. The 
communitarian self, then, cannot be held as a cramped or shackled self acting robotically at the 
beck and call of the communal structure.  That structure is never to be conceived as, or likened 
to, the Medusa head the sight of which reduces a person to inactivity and supineness …”  
Appiah (1994) also, relativises a strong communitarian position when he argues that communal values such as 
generosity, compassion, reciprocity, cooperation, solidarity and so on, rather support than offend the liberal 
principles of human rights.  According to Appiah, these communal values are not instrumentally grounded. They 
are symbolically grounded in the tradition of the people in  communities and consequently, both social and 
individual identities are important in the discourse of community in Africa. 
The sociological discussion on the discourse of community in Africa, dates back to the distinction between the 
concepts of community and society made by the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies (1988) in his book 
Gemeinschaft (community) und Gesellschaft (society).  Tönnies points out that community and society are two 
major forms of social interaction or social life (Zusammenleben) among human beings. 
Gemeinschaftt (community) is characterised by emotionally deep relationships, dominated by moral obligation, 
social cohesion and continuity, whereas, Gesellschaft (society) is characterised relationships that are dominated by 
exchanges based on individual self-interests. Stated differently, community is linked to traditional social life and is 
characterised by warm or binding relationships between persons, whereas  society is identified with more cold or 
indifferent relationships between persons. 
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On the basis of this analysis, Tönnies concludes that there is a development in Western/European societies 
towards more Gesellschaft (societal) than Gemeinschaft  (communal) relationships, while African societies reveal 
a closer orientation to  Gemeinshaft than to Gesellschaft.   
The political discourse with regard to community in Africa is linked to the role of African states in the 
developmental process and is generally connected with development theories.  Broadly speaking, there are two 
approaches to development. The first is centred on economic growth, and the second on human development.  
The human development approach places the people of a community at the centre of projects and development 
strategies, and  uses concepts like ‘empowerment’, ‘equity’, ‘capacity building’ and ‘participation’ to describe the 
developmental process. This approach is also known as the community development approach.
According to Monaheng (2000:127) the human development approach has been broadly used in project 
development in rural communities.  It was supposed that poor people live mainly in the rural areas, and as a result,  
the concept “community” has also been assigned the meaning, “rural” development. 
My concern in noting the philosophical, sociological and political elements inherent in the discourse of community 
in Africa has been directed at highlighting the role of community knowledge in education research. It is evident 
from these philosophical, sociological and political inferences that the discourse of community in Africa reveals 
that: 
x Community based researchers in education should be sensitive to the double role of individuals in African 
societies. Elders and other ‘epistemic authorities’ (Kaphagawani & Malherbe 1998:214) in communities should 
not only be perceived as important informants, but also as research colleagues with critical perspectives on 
educational practices. Also, in that learning is an individual endeavour, it will be important to open the 
necessary spaces for individuals in all community based research processes. 
x The Gemeinschaft (communal) nature of African societies indicates that community based research is well 
suited to researching issues in education in an African context.
x Political discourse in relation to community in Africa can be seen to allign itself community based research 
insofar as this political discourse is concerned with human development in the context of communities. 
2. What are the implications of an indigenous african epistemology of communalism for research in 
education
In terms of these philosophical, sociological and political inferences I would argue that the significance of 
indigenous African epistemologies for research in education is centred in the question of communalism. In other 
words, if we can speak of an indigenous African epistemology which is characterised by discourses of 
community, then I would argue for the appropriation of relevant research methodologies that would not only take 
into account indigenous African knowledge systems, but also be directed at addressing the needs of local African 
communities. In short, the argument here is one of advocating the appropriate research method(s) for a given set 
of circumstances because the logical implication of an indigenous African epistemology for research is that 
research methodologies should be closely linked to communal values. And for researchers in education this 
means, that they should take cognisance of the values that strengthen communal behaviours and regard these 
values as fundamental to the learning content of curricula in education. In other words, I would argues for the 
need for a form of African community based research which takes cognisance of indigenous African 
epistemologies and values present in the community, for purposes of fostering the communal discourse of that 
community. Community based research is, therefore, a kind of research that is conducted by, with and, for the 
community.  
But what is a community? I would like to suggest that a community consists of a number of people who have 
something in common with one another that connects them in some way, and that distinquishes them from others. 
The basis of this connection can be geographical, but members may also be connected by other factors such as 
langauge and, ethnic or religious identification. 
The core characteristic then of African community based research is participatory research, that is, a form of 
research that seeks to enhance the capacity of the community members to participate in the process that shapes 
research approaches and intervention strategies. The active co-operation and participation of members within the 
community are, therefore, the essential components of African community based research. In other words, African 
community based research is a form of research that is conducted by, with, and for the community. In African 
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community based research, the community is recognised as a primary stakeholder and actively participates in 
determining the ends to which research resources are dedicated. That is, the community becomes an active agenda 
setter for science and technology rather than just a passive data provider and consumer of research results. In this 
way, research capacity is applied democratically to respond to local needs in such areas as health, education, 
natural resources management, and urbanisation. African community based research, therefore, functions to make 
the research method or system more responsive to the pressing social needs of the community, and in the process, 
encourages more democratic forms of science and technology. In so doing, African community based research 
focuses on community social problems and needs, and yields important benefits, such as: 
x it delivers highly cost-effective development results 
x it helps weave the fabric of grassroots democracy, and 
x it builds constituencies for the opening of educational doors to community knowledge. 
The problem-solving orientation of African community based research, relative to more investigator-driven 
research approaches such as action, and ethnomethodological, research, thus leads more directly and immediately 
to clear, tangible impacts in areas with high priority to communities.   
But how does African community based research differ from action research? African community based 
research is more process oriented, in that it does not necessarily aim at a certain "product", but rather at 
strengthening the knowledge that already resides in the community. And how does African community based 
research differ from ethno-methodological research? I would suggest in two fundamental ways: 
x Unlike ethno-methodological research, African community based research regards communities and 
insiders, that is, people in the communities themselves, as both the object and the subject of knowledge. In 
other words, much of the ethno-methodological research done in communities has tended to be about, but 
not with the community. Members of the community appear not as participants in the research, but rather 
as objects for research. In this regard, African community based research is sensitive to the double role of 
individuals in African societies. Elders and other so-called ‘epistemic authorities’ (Kaphagawani & 
Malherbe 1998:214) in communities should not only be perceived as important informants, but also as 
research colleagues with critical perspectives on the issues under scrutiny.  
x Also, unlike ethno-methodology, which presupposes the existence of a community that thinks 
“collectively”, and thereby ignores the significance of any form of individual consciousness in that 
community, African community based research takes cognisance of individual thinking and criticism of 
communal values 
But also to be noted in the scope of African community based research is what I refer to as its trans-traditional 
vantage. By this I mean that African community based research acknowledges the validity of  other non-African 
knowledge systems and the need to intergrate indigenous knowledge systems with these. The importance of this 
trans-traditional vantage of African community based research is emphasised by Wiredu (1980:54), who 
maintains that the urgent problem facing African intellectuals in regards to the whole question of knowledge 
production in Africa, is the need to address critically attempts being made to improve the living conditions of 
people in local communities by means of recourse to indigenous knowledge systems. He acknowledges that many 
African intellectuals felt they had to defend communities against global corporations, who for example, tried to 
replace indigenous agriculture with “banana plantations”.  As a result, African intellectuals were forced to go to 
communities and help members  set up developments that could resist international corporations, and at the same 
time help communities develop themselves.  
However, according to Wiredu, African intellectuals who continue to revive and reinstate traditional thinking in 
Africa without reference to present modern ways of thinking, are doing a disservice to Africa by pretending that 
traditional ways of thinking are still sufficient, useful or even applicable to today’s needs in Africa. According to 
Wiredu, there are new and modern problems and challenges facing Africa, and traditional ways of thinking cannot 
always cope with these problems and challenges.   
In the light of Wiredu’s remarks, it is important to note that, African community based research does not only 
attempt to revive and reinstate indigenous African knowledge systems and ignore the impact of modernity and 
industrialisation.  Rather, African community based research aims to intergrate indigenous African knowledge 
systems with modern knowledge systems, and in the case of education, schools are seen to be one location point 
of intergration.  
African community based research will, therefore, give research in Africa a social basis by linking research 
with community needs and experiences.  Indeed, I would argue that African community based research plays a 
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significant role in research in an African context, because it forces the inclusion of a grassroots perspective into 
research and contributes to a desalination of research as being very elitist. Furthermore, African community based 
research opens new opportunities, and offers tangible results, for a distinctive form of African research which is 
characterised by: 
x the integration of indigenous and community-based knowledge systems into existing knowledge systems, 
while at the same time exposing indigenous communities to (scientific) knowledge production and 
dissemination, founded on indigenous cultural and social values, and 
x a recognition of communities as primary stakeholders and active participants in determining the ends to 
which research resources are dedicated 
4. Conclusion 
Research has a social context. It does not occur in isolation, nor is it beyond the human motives and culture of 
the researcher. These influence people’s behaviour and judgements about different aspects of life including 
research. There is, therefore, a need for researchers to take seriously the relationship between knowledge and 
cultural power. Asante (1990) articulates this cultural standpoint when he points to the need to redefine the role of 
research within the context of culture: 
All knowledge results from an occasion of encounter in place. But the place remains a rightly 
shaped perspective that allows the researcher to put African ideals and values at the centre of 
inquiry. 
This emphasis on culture is taken up in the discourse of community in indigenous African epistemologies 
which highlight the role of community knowledge in educational research. In short,  the discourse on community 
in Africa reveals the significance of indigenous African epistemologies for higher education research, and this, in 
turn, leads to a twofold problematic which needs to be taken up by researchers in education, namely: 
x how accommodating are higher education systems when it comes to integrating indigenous African and 
community-based knowledge systems, in other words, one of the important questions confronting 
reseachers in education is how to access the knowledge produced and circulated within communities and 
make them the the subject of teaching and learning in higher education, and
x how can research in education assist in this process of intergration 
In taking up this twofold problematic, I have argued that the main concern of community based research in 
education should be to help integrate indigenous and community based knowledge systems into education 
curricula, while at the same time expose indigenous communities to knowledge production and dissemination 
founded on indigenous cultural and social values. 
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